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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between a firm´s Thomson Reuters ESG score and its 
weighted average cost of capital & implied credit default swap spread. The research is 
conducted on the Swedish stock exchanges and uses all available firms with an available ESG 
score. The effect is measured from 2017 to 2019. The paper uses a random effects regression 
in combination with a pooled OLS regression to determine the relationships. There is no 
evidence that ESG score affect a firm´s weighted average cost of capital. There is evidence at 
5% significance that ESG have a positive effect on a firm´s implied CDS spread with a 
coefficient of .2081717 or .2368187, depending on the modelling. The findings stand in 
contrast to some previous literature which finds that ESG has a significant effect on a firm´s 
cost of capital.  
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
It seems mankind is living beyond its means. There are threats of global warming, social 
dividing and economic injustices, (United Nations (UN), 2019). With these issues, firms 
must satisfy both demands from its stakeholders, whilst battling in the marketplace to 
make a profit for their shareholders, (Freeman & McVea, Working paper). 
Sustainability has gained major importance and the number of institutions concerned by it 
likewise. Today all firms on the OMXS30 index either provide an annual sustainability report 
or provide it in combination with their annual reports, appendix table 15. Firms on the 
OMXS30 are not alone in providing sustainability reports as this pattern shows in their 
American counterpart where more than 85% of all firms on the S&P500 index disclose 
sustainability information, (Market Watch, 2018).  There are no doubt firms are aware of the 
importance of sustainability and the role it plays in the firm´s equation for longevity and 
prosperity.  For instance; recently the CEO of the world’s largest investor, BlackRock inc, 
communicated in his annual letter to his employees to consider more than financial profits. 
(Fink, 2019). Fink told the employees to also consider leaving a better world for their 
children. This raises the question if leaving a better world for the children stands in contrast to 
a firm to operate efficiently and profitably. It is not certain if a firm can gain a competitive 
advantage when it means a firm will be internalize costs which it would otherwise not be 
concerned with.  
There are several conceptual ways to gain a competitive advantage through sustainability 
which include a better corporate image or reputation (Bauer & Hann, 2010) which may lead 
to higher demand from the public or incorporating sustainability as a means of reducing future 
potential sustainability related costs. For instance, a firm which decides not to invest in 
customer safety but continued to sell unsafe products, might face higher uncertainty for future 
unexpected legal fees thus increasing its financial risk. 
There is no single definition of corporate sustainability, but it is sometimes defined as a 
paradigm under which firms achieve a competitive advantage, through sustainable business 
operations, (Wilson, 2003). This competitive advantage is part of the rationale for investment 
funds whose goal it is to invest sustainably, and those funds can expect to achieve advantages 
for investing in firms that are more sustainable in form of lower cost of capital, (Attig, Ghoul, 
Guedhami, & Suh, 2013). They can therefore invest in projects which are sustainable whilst 
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also providing financial returns for their investors. This investment strategy is however not 
uncontroversial and the idea that firms should act sustainably was criticised in 1970 by 
economist Milton Friedman.  
Friedman argued there is nothing inherently wrong with a person acting for the greater good 
or in this case sustainably. However, when a manager intends of contributing to a greater 
good despite it contradicting the shareholder´s goals of e.g. profit maximization, that is when 
the altruistic behaviour becomes unethical, (Friedman, 1970). Friedman´s statements were 
made in an era different from today´s and his stance is being challenged. As stated, all firms 
on the OMXS30 index provide annual sustainability information, see Table 15 in appendix.  
The marketplace is a tough place. Firms want to maximize profits and if a firm fails to make a 
profit long enough, that firm will not be able to survive. Firms are aware of the circumstances 
regarding their survivability, and the fierce competition has historically been a major source 
of innovation (Philippe Aghion et al., 2005). With survival and competition in mind, one 
might see the sustainability reporting and sustainability efforts in another light. Sustainability 
could also be a means of innovation and increased sustainability might be a medium for firms 
to both reduce future legal and judicial risk whilst potentially increase transparency for its 
stakeholders, (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013). With this in mind, it might also be in the 
interest of the shareholders to increase its sustainability efforts. If this is the case, it could help 
explain the disruption of corporate sustainability and sustainability reporting that has shifted 
the large firm´s focus from a shareholder to a stakeholder perspective, (Freeman & McVea, 
Working paper). 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate if there exists a relationship between a firm´s 
sustainability efforts and both its riskiness and cost of capital. The thesis aims at researching 
the Swedish stock exchange. The results will be the foundation for both the discussions and 
the analysis´ on how ESG scores affect a firm´s riskiness and its cost of capital. There is 
previous literature on the subject but most research focuses on the American stock exchange, 
(Bauer & Hann, 2010), (Oikonomou & al, 2014), (Attig, Ghoul, Guedhami, & Suh, 2013). 
Thus, data on the relationship on the Swedish stock exchange will provide further insights on 
the subject. The thesis is limited to the Swedish stock exchange to isolate the effect to this 
market and not that of the e.g. European market or U.S market. 
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1.3 Research questions and expected results 
The paper is divided in two hypotheses. The first one will measure if ESG has any effect on a 
firm´s cost of capital whilst the second will measure if ESG has any effect on a firm´s 
riskiness. Riskiness will be measured by the implied CDS spread a company faces in the 
market 
Hypothesis I 
H10: There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its cost of capital. 
H1A: There is a significant relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its cost of capital. 
 
From previous literature (El Ghoul & al, 2011), (Oikonomou & al, 2014) (Goss & Roberts, 
2011), a firm´s ESG score should have a negative impact on its cost of capital. The results are 
intuitive from certain effects. The first and the most obvious is that when a firm increases its 
sustainability reporting and the details of it, the firm also increases both financial and non-
information about itself to the market, (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013). When the 
information increases, uncertainties decrease. Uncertainties have a negative effect on cost of 
capital since investors are assumed to be risk averse, (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). The increased 
information aspect explained (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013)´s findings when they 
concluded ESG scores increased a firm´s access to capital.  The second effect ESG score 
could have on a firm´s cost of capital is the effect which (Bauer & Hann, 2010) discovered; 
that preventive ESG efforts could lead to less uncertainties of future cashflows and thus 
decrease the probability of sustainability related incidents. In conclusion should a firm with 
good ESG score hypothetically have a lower cost of capital.  
 
Hypothesis II 
H20: There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its riskiness 
H2A: There is a statistical relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its riskiness 
 
The hypothesis how a firm´s ESG score affects its riskiness is not as well studied as the cost 
of capital. Although there should theoretically be a direct relationship between risk and capital 
cost, at least according to classic finance theories such as CAPM, (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013), 
there could be differences between the results in capital cost and a firm´s implied riskiness. If 
one decides to follow the evidence provided by (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013), that 
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there is a negative relationship between a firm´s ESG score and the riskiness that the market 
expects of the firm. It is however important to understand the difference between the true 
riskiness of the firm´s operations and the riskiness which the market assesses the firm. As the 
true riskiness is hard to determine and could face subjectivity, a proxy is used. The proxy is a 
firm´s implied CDS spread. More on this in part 4.1 random effects regression 
Just like in hypothesis I, when a firm increases the amounts of disclosed financial and non-
financial information, the uncertainty that the investors face reduces and so should also the 
riskiness for the investors (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013). This is the rationale so that 
firms which have higher ESG score should have lower riskiness.  
2.0 Result of literature 
This section discloses previous literature and its conclusions. This section also includes an 
exposition of glossaries which helps understand financial terms.  
2.1 Glossary  
Basis points (BP): 1/100th of a percentage. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013).  
Market risk: The market risk is also called systemic risk and is risk that an investor is unable 
to reduce through diversification, (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). This is due to market risk 
affecting the market and is therefore affecting all entities within given market. 
Credit risk: The risk of a bond which is due to the borrower is facing a possibility of default, 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). 
Cost of capital: The required return a project must yield, given its riskiness. A project or a 
firm with greater risk must also yield a higher return for its investors, (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2013). 
Agency cost: Costs which arise because of a principal and an agent working towards different 
goals. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013)  
 
2.2 Previous studies on corporate sustainability´s effect on cost of capital 
There is plenty research on the topic. Whilst most of prior research focuses on the American 
market; this thesis will focus on solely the Swedish. These previous studies generally 
conclude having a high ESG score will lower the firm´s cost of capital. Not all studies have 
studied the effect ESG had on the bond pricing. Some studies measured the effect on equity 
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financing or bank financing, but the sign of conclusion remained equal, but with different 
amplitude i.e. better ESG rating lead to lower cost of capital.  
How ESG affects cost of capital 
There are previous literature which examine the relationship between a firm´s ESG score and 
its cost of capital.  In 2011, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami, Chuck C.Y. Kwok, and Dev 
R. Mishra measured the effect corporate social responsibility had on a firm´s cost of equity. 
(El Ghoul & al, 2011) measured the relationships on the U.S. market and could conclude there 
was a significant relationship between a firm´s ESG score and the cost of equity with an effect 
of 200bp lower cost of equity for more sustainable firms. The group is not alone, and similar 
conclusions have been made by other researches. In 2014, Ioannis Oikonomou, Chris Brooks, 
and Stephen Pavelin measured the impact that different dimensions of ESG had on the pricing 
on corporate debt. Just like El Ghoul et al., this study focused on the U.S. market. 
(Oikonomou & al, 2014) could also conclude that there was a significant relationship between 
ESG scores and the pricing of corporate debt. The measured effect was up to 100bp less 
spread on their corporate bonds for firms with high sustainability ratings in contrast to firms 
with low rating. 
The effect of ESG ratings have also been studied on how it affects a firm´s pricing of bank 
loans. In 2011, Alles Goss and Gordon S. Roberts studies the relationship between ESG 
ratings and the cost of bank debt. (Goss & Roberts, 2011) conducted its research on the U.S. 
equity market. The duo concluded that depending on how they structured their models, the 
estimated effect that better ESG ratings had on the price of bank debt was between 7 to 18bp 
lower for firms with higher ESG ratings.  
ESG and the relationship to credit ratings 
The relationship between ESG and credit ratings have research in the literature. Using credit 
ratings is a good tool to determine the riskiness of a firm.  
Rob Bauer and Daniel Hann analyses environmental management how it affects bond 
investors. The thesis was initiated in 2010 and is still a working paper but the duo has 
concluded that environmental incidents tend to lead to higher cost of dept and lower credit 
ratings and that proactive environmental work tends to lead to lower cost of debt. The duo 
assessed the effects to that firms which put efforts in environmental proactive work mitigate 
legal, reputational, and regulatory risks that are associated with environmental incidents. 
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In 2013, Najah Attig, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami, and Jungwon Suh researched how 
corporate social responsibility affected credit ratings for firms. (Attig, Ghoul, Guedhami, & 
Suh, 2013) studied the relationship on the U.S. equity market and their research covered the 
period 1991 to 2010. The group observed 1585 unique firms over this period. The study 
provides evidence that there is a positive relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its 
credit ratings. A firm with good ESG score tends to have a better credit rating. The positive 
effect was attributed to information gains, where firms which provided more non-financial 
information indirectly provided information which was beneficial from the credit rating´s 
perspective and thus for the firm´s overall creditworthiness. 
Corporate social responsibility and access to capital 
In 2013 Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim researched how corporate 
social responsibility affected a firm´s ability to get financing. (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 
2013) researched the effect from 2002 to 2009 and researched firms from different continents 
and in different industries. The trio concluded that increased corporate sustainability 
performance lead to lower capital constrains and in extension better access to capital. The 
effect was attributed to two main factors. The first factor being higher stakeholder 
engagement. The trio explained that better sustainability performance leads to a higher 
stakeholder engagement. When stakeholders are more engaged, the likelihood of the firm to 
undertake short term behaviour decreases and asymmetrical information likewise. Secondly, 
the trio concludes an increased sustainability performance leads to better transparency and 
increased accountability. This in extent also reduces asymmetrical information and mitigates 
risk for an investor.  
3. Data 
This section will provide information on how and when all data has been collected. It also 
includes brief short comings such as missing values and timing issues. There are three 
different types of data which will be separated in their respective group: interest, control and 
response variables.  
Control variables 
All control variables are collected primarily from Bloomberg Terminal per 2019-05-03. In 
cases where Bloomberg is unable to provide all firm´s values, the values will be taken from 
that firm´s 2018 annual report. In cases where 2018´s annual report is yet to be announced, 
the latest interim report is used to collect the most recent data and avoid timing issues. The 
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firms which data has been collected from annual or interim reports are shown in appendix, 
Table 14. 
Not all firms have equity and debt which are applicable to determine its leverage ratio. Two 
firms, Swedish match AB and Lundin Petroleum AB have negative equity. (Avanza AB, 
2019), (Avanza AB, 2019). The fact that their equity is negative renders their leverage ratios 
unreliable and unusable. These numbers have therefore been nullified but not been excluded 
to fulfil the full rank assumption of regressions, this is further discussed in part 6.1 Critical 
Discussion 
Response variables 
There are two response variables in this study, weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and 
implied CDS spread (IMP_DEF). All data regarding the firm´s WACC is collected from 
Bloomberg Terminal per 2019-05-03 and there are no missing values. All data regarding the 
implied CDS default rate of firms are collected from Bloomberg Terminal per 2019-05-03. 
There are no missing values in this category either.  
Interest variables 
This study uses one interest variable and that is the Thomson Reuters ESG score. This interest 
variable is collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon per 2019-05-03. The datapoints are from 
2017, 2018, and 2019. Since these values are calculated only once per year (Thomson 
Reuters, 2019) there is no timing issue with the data not being specified further than yearly 
basis. In cases where ESG data is totally missing, there is no viable substitute since there is no 
similar ESG score with the same methodology. Therefore, any firm without a Thomson 
Reuters ESG score will be excluded from the data set and likewise the study. In total there are 
71 firms listed on any Swedish stock exchange which Thomson Reuters provide ESG data on. 
All firms have data from both 2019, 2018, and 2017 except 8 firms which are listed in Table 
12 in appendix. 
All missing ESG values have been replaced by the latest previous, available values. This is 
done since the distribution of the missing values not being completely random. Why this is 
reasonable is further discussed in part 6.1 Critical discussion. 
4. Method 
To evaluate if there exists a relationship between a firm’s ESG score and its weighted average 
cost of capital and implied CDS spread, there will be a series of statistical tests. The results 
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are divided into two parts: descriptive and inferential statistics with the first part being 
descriptive statistics.  
Initially there is a correlation matrix. The matrix describes the relationship between all 
variables i.e. interest, control, and response variables. The correlation matrix is a great tool to 
determine the correlations between variables and understanding these correlations helps the 
reader grasp the data. There is also a panel summary which describe the data both a cross-
sectional and time component. The descriptive statistics is presented to help the reader easier 
grasp the inferential statistics.  
For the inferential statistics, the focus is regression. Since there are two response variables, 
WACC and IMP_DEF, there will always be double tests, one for each variable. As the data is 
panel, the primarily focus will be on random effects regression. To determine that a random 
effects test is more efficient than a fixed effects regression (Greene, 2012), there is also a 
Hausman test. This is done in the robustness section and is an important tool to support the 
choice of random effects regression.  
There is also a pooled OLS regression. A pooled OLS regression does not control for the data 
being panel data but rather pools all observations as if the test were cross-sectional. Therefore, 
this test could have lower efficiency than the random effects test, (Greene, 2012). Since there 
might in fact be a time component to the data, a variable for time trend will be included in 
both the pooled OLS models. There is also a test to determine if it is appropriate to include a 
time variable in the pooled OLS model. The time test is done for both pooled OLS regression, 
but not for the random effects regression since it is per construction accounted for in this 
model, (Greene, 2012) 
4.1 Random effect regression 
The main source of statistical inference will be random effects regression. The random effects 
regression is suitable to use when the individual effects are strictly uncorrelated with the 
regressors (Greene, 2012). The random effects model assumes that the regressors are 
uncorrelated and treats the constants as randomly distributed, cross-sectionally. The random 
effects model is efficient when dealing with dataset which contains relatively many individual 
observations (n), but with few time dependent data points (t), (Greene, 2012). This is the case 
for this data set and to make sure it is statistically viable there is a Hausman test in section 
5.3.1. To make sure the Random effects regression does not suffer from endogeneity or 
omitted variable bias, there are several control variables included, which are taken from the 
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literature, (Bauer & Hann, 2010). The tests will result in two different measurements which 
both will describe how ESG relates to WACC and implied CDS spread.  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡  , 𝐼𝑀𝑃_𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 
= 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ ln _𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑋𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5CAP_INTit + 𝜑1 ∗ 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
Where: βk is the regression coefficient of every individual random variable and the letter k represents nominal 
values for respective beta and: 
i represents every individual firm and 
t represents the time in which any data point is collected. 
Interest variables 
This thesis focuses on one single interest variable and it is the Thomson Reuters ESG rating. 
ESG score- Thomson Reuters have one of the largest ESG information collections worldwide, 
(Thomson Reuters, 2019). The index processes publicly available data with the goal of 
providing timely and objective coverage. The index collects more than 400 ESG 
measurements which are individually standardized so that for the information to be 
comparable between different firms and industries. In most cases, the ESG score is updated 
yearly in line with the firms´ own ESG disclosure through e.g. sustainability reporting. The 
data is sourced in combination of human an algorithmic sourcing to achieve as accurate 
scoring as possible, (Thomson Reuters, 2019). The index has existed since 2003 and has since 
expanded to cover more than 7000 firms worldwide and of that, more than 1200 being 
European.  
The Thomson Reuters ESG scores are designed to measure firm´s relative ESG performance 
and divides a firm´s performance into 10 categories. Thomson Reuters provides two different 
ESG scoring systems but only one measurement will be used in this thesis – the ESG score. 
The other scoring system is the Combined ESG scoring system. The combined ESG scoring 
system takes a firm´s ESG scoring and discounts it when a firm has had any recent 
sustainability controversies. The 400 company specific measures that are recorded are further 
grouped into 178 subsets of relevant groups. These 178 subsets are then grouped into 10 
categories. These 10 categories are: Resource use, Emissions, Innovation, Management, 
Shareholders, CSR strategy, Workforce, Human Rights, Community, and Product 
Responsibility. Further description: see Table 13 in the appendix. 
The 10 categories are then weighted proportionally, meaning categories with more data gets a 
greater weight, and the result are three fundamental scores of ESG ratings: Environmental, 
Social and Corporate Governance. These three together is a firm´s Thomson Reuters ESG 
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score. The scores can take the values from 0 to 1 with 0 being the poorest performing 
company and 1 being the best, (Thomson Reuters, 2019). 
Response variables  
Implied CDS spread (IMP_DEF) – The implied credit default swap (CDS) spread is derived 
from measuring the spread an investor requires to invest in a company specific CDS with 5-
year maturity, (Bloomberg terminal, 2019). If the likelihood of a firm defaulting is higher, 
then the implied CDS spread will increase. Since the probability of any firm in the sample to 
default is miniscule, the CDS spread is measured in basis points, (Bloomberg terminal, 2019). 
The Implied CDS is a measurement of risk that the market indirectly assesses to a firm. A 
firm with higher implied CDS spread is henceforth implied to have higher risk and the 
measurement therefore acts as an indicator of how risky a firm is. 
WACC- WACC is a measurement of a firms weighted average cost of capital. WACC is a tool 
get a precise picture of the real cost of capital, since debt payments often are tax deductible. 
The WACC is collected from the Bloomberg Terminal and all estimates are from the latest 
annual or interim report the firms have reported, (Bloomberg terminal, 2019). If a firm has no 
preferred equity and no debt, its WACC will equal the firm´s cost of equity, which is the 
required return an investor would require from the firm to undertake the financial risk of 
investing in the firm. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013) 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = [𝐾𝐷 ∗ (
𝑇𝐷
𝑉
)] + [𝐾𝑃 ∗ (
𝑃
𝑉
)] + [𝐾𝐸 ∗ (
𝐸
𝑉
)] 
Where: 
KD= cost of debt 
TD= total debt 
V =total capital 
KP=cost of preferred equity 
P= preferred equity 
KE= cost of equity 
E= equity capital 
Source: Bloomberg terminal, (2019) 
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Control variables 
Multiple control variables are included in all regressions to make sure no regression model 
suffer from endogeneity. The control variables are collected from the literature, (Bauer & 
Hann, 2010) and (Oikonomou & al, 2014). 
Ln_size- Size is the number of total assets on a firm´s balance sheet. Size is measured in 
millions SEK which is later translated into its natural logarithmic form. All firm´s values are 
in SEK, so no exchange rates must be applied. Previous literature has found a significant 
coefficient telling larger firms should have a higher lower cost of capital and be less risky. 
(Oikonomou & al, 2014) 
ln _𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = ln (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
 
Capital intensity- The value is calculated by subtracting the number of current assets from the 
total assets. The numbers are normalized and can take the values from 0 to 1. This number 
implies how much of a firm´s assets are fixed and/or illiquid. Firms whom have low margins 
of current assets could potentially find it harder to find liquidity in case of an urgent short 
coming of liquidity and have a harder time to repay its liabilities than a firm which is not. 
Firms which all their assets are financial, are not applicable to such a measurement and all 
therefore their values are assumed to be 0. Both total and current assets are collected from 
every individual firm´s latest report, either being latest annual or interim report.  
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 −
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Leverage ratio- Leverage is defined as an individual firm´s total liabilities divided by its 
equity. The measurement shows whether a firm is in large debt or if it has financed its 
operation by equity from its shareholders or retained earnings, (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). 
Since debt have a senior claim to cashflow, a large leverage could render a firm´s equity 
riskier, hence increasing its cost of equity.  
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔
𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎
. 
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BANK - This is a dummy variable to make sure there is no omitted variable bias in the 
leverage control variable. This variable is necessary since banks tend to have a different, more 
leveraged capital structure than other firms, see Table 2 Correlation matrix. The BANK 
variable is derived from the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), an industry index 
made by Morgan Stanley in collaboration with Standard & Poor, (GICS Global Industry 
Classification Standard, 2019). The industry assesses industry information worldwide and 
classifies firms according to their main business activity, (Bloomberg terminal, 2019) 
The index classifies firms into 24 different industries, (GICS Global Industry Classification 
Standard, 2019). All firms which have banking as their main business will obtain a BANK 
score of 1 whilst all other firms will have their BANK score 0. 
Price to book-ratio (PXTB)- Also called market to book-ratio. The price to book-ratio is 
defined as the valuation the market puts on a firm´s equity divided by the value of equity the 
firm accounts in its books, (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). The ratio can depend on within which 
industry a firm is operating. Firms with large off-balance sheet assets tend to have a higher 
PXTB-ratio since the value of the assets still are accounted for by the market but not the 
company itself. The ratio could also have explanatory power for a firm´s riskiness and WACC 
since a firm which is the subject for low PXTB-ratio, has the market valuing its equity lower 
than the firm value it itself. This could be a sign of financial distress.  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
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5.0 Empirical Results 
This section provides the results of the thesis. The section is divided into two parts, starting 
with descriptive statistics. This is followed by inferential statistics which is where all tests are 
displayed.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This part will help the reader understand the underlying data. This is done by a panel 
summary and a correlation matrix.  
Table 1 Panel summary 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
WACC overall  7.537905% 2.826566% 1.6777% 15.98241% N =     213 
 between   1.56556% 6.469496% 9.334985% n =      71 
 within   2.519481% .3257467% 14.18533% T =      3 
IMP_DEF overall  62.60563bp 25.455bp 16 bp 157bp N =     213 
 between   6.962777bp 54.64789 
bp 
67.57746bp n =      71 
 within   24.80896bp 14.02817bp 154.0141bp T =      3 
ESG overall  59.47549 16.80276bp 19.05864 86.19053 N =     213 
 between   1.141468 58.48711 60.72484 n =      71 
 within   16.77677 19.44162 87.17891 T =      3 
CAP_INT overall  .6453453 .2435439 .0103642 1 N =     213 
 between   .0008695 .6444408 .646175 n =      71 
 within   .2435429 .0111028 1 T =      3 
ln_size overall  10.39276 1.656269 5.490177 14.95793 N =     213 
 between   .0612743 10.3256 10.44562 n =      71 
 within   1.65551 5.557335 14.96823 T =      3 
LEV overall  3.266728 3.837586 1 22.596 N =     213 
 between   .1294576 3.140517 3.399204 n =      71 
 within   3.836123 .867524 22.60226 T =      3 
PXTB overall  2.839771 2.533508 .5000365 21.80897 N =     213 
 between   .1660484 2.688211 3.017258 n =      71 
 within   2.52986 .32255 21.63149 T =      3 
BANK_FIN overall  .0422535 .2016409 0 1 N =     213 
 between   0 .0422535 .0422535 n =      71 
 within   .2016409 0 1 T =      3 
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The panel summary sums all variables and presents their values. Since the data is panel data, there is both a cross-
sectional and a time-series component present.  
 
The Table 1 Panel Summary shows all the variables and presents them descriptively. There 
are no underlying tests present, the data is only presented. The mean describes the average of 
all observations. The standard deviation (Std.Dev) is split into 3 parts; an overall, a between, 
and a within component. These different measurements describe how the data differs between 
different firms, within different firms (since the data is also time-series data), and these two 
measurements combined effect. The min shows the smallest value the data take, the max 
shows the largest. Observations is divided into 3 parts which tells the total number of 
observations and how the observations are divided into different firms and in different time. N 
is the total number of observations, T is the time component and n is the total number of 
firms.  
Table 2 Correlation matrix 
Variables WACC IMP_DEF ESG CAP_INT ln_size LEV PXTB BANK 
WACC 1.0000        
IMP_DEF -0.1451 1.0000       
ESG -0.1142 0.0720 1.0000      
CAP_INT -0.1788 0.0931 0.0513 1.0000     
ln_size -0.1624 -0.2625 0.4544 -0.1854 1.0000    
LEV -0.4477 0.0134 0.2583 -0.3918 0.5473  1.0000   
PXTB 0.2787 -0.1490 -0.2380 -0.1761 -0.4223 -0.1016 1.0000  
BANK -0.3876 -0.1272 0.2024 -0.4113 0.5620 0.93 10 -0.1177 1.0000 
The correlation matrix shows all correlations between interest variables, control variables and response variables.  
Since the data is both time series and cross sectional, one should be careful to draw any 
conclusions from this simple correlation effect. The matrix is mere an instrument to further 
understand the data. There are correlations which are important to notice and understanding 
them will help comprehend the results.  
LEV & BANK: The correlation between LEV and BANK is important to notice since increased 
leverage leads to higher equity beta of a firm (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013) and therefore increases 
the riskiness of the equity. This in combination with banks having a negative correlation with 
WACC results in BANK being an important variable to include into the regression to reduce 
potential omitted variable bias in the LEV variable so that the effect of BANK is not included 
in the LEV variable.  
 
WACC & LEV: Of all the correlations with the WACC, the leverage (LEV) is the strongest. 
With a correlation coefficient of -0.4477, one must understand that the higher a firm has 
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leveraged its equity, the lower that firm´s WACC is expected to be. This is important to know 
when interpreting the results in part 6.2 Discussion Hypothesis I 
 
5.2 Inferential statistics 
This part is where the hypothesis´ are tested. The tests are done twice. One for each interest 
variable and its hypothesis.  
5.2.1 Hypothesis I – ESG score has no effect on firm´s WACC 
In this part, Hypothesis I is tested by running a random effects regression. The results from 
the regression will be divided into two parts. The first part is a descriptive part of the wald 
chi2 output, which explains the model over all. This part also shows the number of cross-
sectional and time dependent observations. The second part is where the coefficients are 
tested, which renders a specific z and thus a p-value for each coefficient.  
Table 3 Random-effects GLS regression output 
Group variable: t Number of obs      213 
Number of groups 3 
R2 Obs per group: 
within 0.4756 min 71 
between 0.9705 avg 71.0 
overall 0.4117 max 71 
    
Wald chi2(6)       144.16 Prob > chi2        0.0000 
corr(u_i, X)    0 (assumed) theta 0 
 
WACC       Coef.    Std. Err. z P>z      [95% Conf. Interval]  
ESG .0065476 .0103993  0.63  0.529     [-.0138345 .0269298] 
CAP_INT -3.692827***  .6178943 5.98    0.000     [-4.903878 -2.481777] 
ln_size .4205347*** .1323824  3.18    0.001        [.16107 .6799994] 
LEV -.5569979***   .1103534  5.05    0.000     [-.7732867 -.3407092] 
PXTB .2864056***  .0688818 4.16    0.000    [.1513997 .4214115] 
BANK .699559 2.138846  0.33    0.744     [-3.492502 4.89162] 
_cons   5.773708***  1.437253  4.02  0.000     [2.956744 8.590672] 
sigma_u 0 
sigma_e    1.855498 
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rho 0   (fraction of variance due to u i) 
The results from the tables above describe the output from the random effects regression and shows how the 
independent variables affect the interest variable i.e. the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
* Significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level  
*** significant at 1% level 
The Table 3 Random-effects GLS regression output shows the Wald chi2 value of the test is 
144.16. This tells us that random effects regression is an appropriate model to estimate the 
effects that is tested. The model has a within R2 of 0.4756, a between R2 of 0.9705, and an 
overall R2 of 0.4117. The R2 shows how good the model is at predicting the values of the 
independent variables by comparing the expected values to the standard errors. 
The random effects regression shows that the ESG variable is insignificant. With a z-value of 
0.63 and a p-value of 0.529, there are no evidence that ESG scores have any effect on a firm´s 
WACC. At least not in this sample and sample space. 
Whilst ESG is not significant, other variables show significance on the WACC. The capital 
intensity (CAP_INT) has a negative coefficient of -3.692827***. This implies that a firm 
which have proportionally more fixed assets would also tend to have a lower WACC.  The 
size which is measured in its natural logarithmic form to prevent skewness in the data (Bauer 
& Hann, 2010) also has a significant effect on the firm´s WACC. Ln_size have a coefficient 
of .4205347***. This tells that larger firms tend to have a higher cost of capital than smaller 
firms. The effect cannot be interpreted linearly since the size variable is measured in 
logarithmic form.  The model also tells that leverage (LEV) has a negative impact on a firm´s 
WACC. The variable has a coefficient of -.5569979***. PXTB which measures how much 
the market values a firm´s equity divided by how the firm´s books value the equity has a 
positive coefficient on a firm´s WACC. With a coefficient of .2864056*** the conclusion can 
be drawn that firms which the market values its equity higher than the firm´s books tend to 
have higher cost of capital.  BANK have a coefficient of .699559 but this variable is 
insignificant at all relevant significance levels. 
In conclusion, there are no evidence from the random effects model that ESG score has any 
significant effect on a firms WACC. 
5.2.2 Hypothesis II - ESG score has no effect on firm´s implied default spread 
In this part, hypothesis II is tested by a random effects regression model. 
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Table 4 Random-effects GLS regression output 
Group variable: t Number of obs      213 
Number of groups 3 
R2 Obs per group: 
within 0.3750 min 71 
between 0.7224 avg 71.0 
overall 0.3346 max 71 
    
Wald chi2(6)       103.57 Prob > chi2        0.0000 
corr(u_i, X)    0 (assumed) theta 0 
   
IMP_DEF        Coef. Std. Err. z P>z      [95% Conf. Interval] 
ESG .2368187**    .0996012  2.38 0.017      [.0416039 .4320334] 
CAP_INT    -2.681669    5.918019 0.45    0.650     [-14.28077 8.917434] 
ln_sizE   -8.85822*** 1.267921  6.99    0.000      [-11.3433 -6.37314] 
LEV 6.83941***    1.056934 6.47    0.000      [4.767857 8.910963] 
PXTB -3.571731***     .659731 5.41    0.000      [-4.86478 -2.278682] 
BANK -107.1633***    20.48527 5.23    0.000     [-147.3137 -67.01288] 
_cons 134.3767***    13.76561 9.76    0.000      [107.3966 161.3568] 
   
sigma_u 0 
sigma_e    19.985718 
rho 0   (fraction of variance due to u i) 
The results from the random effects regression are shown in the three tables above. Each table with its specific 
information. The tables show how the independent variables affects the interest variable, the implied CDS 
spread. The implied CDS spread is measured in basis points (bp). 
* Significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
The Table 4 Random-effects GLS regression output shows that the model has a Wald-chi2 
value of 103.57*** which tells us the model is significant. When this number is high, it is 
more relevant to use this model over a fixed effect model, see part 5.3.1 Hausmantest. for 
further explanation. The model has a within R2 value of 0.3750, a between R2 value of 0.7224 
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and an overall R2 value of 0.3346. These R2 values hint that the random effects model has 
some forecasting ability. 
The random effects model on IMP_DEF has a coefficient on ESG of .2368187**, which is 
significant at 5% significance level. The significant coefficient implies it can be concluded 
that higher ESG score will lead to higher implied CDS spread, i.e. a firm with good ESG 
score will have a higher probability of default. This conclusion can be drawn with the risk for 
type I error at 0.05 or 5%. 
There are more significant variables that affects the IMP_DEF. The capital intensity 
(CAP_INT) is insignificant at all relevant significance levels. The total assets measured in its 
logarithmic form (ln_size) has a coefficient of -8.85822***. This implies that size has a 
negative effect on the implied CDS spread i.e. the bigger a firm is, the less risk the market 
perceives the firm to default. The leverage (LEV) has a positive coefficient of 6.83941***. 
The coefficient implies that the higher the firm has leveraged its equity, the riskier the market 
perceive the firm to be. Furthermore, price to book-ratio (PXTB) has a negative effect on the 
IMP_DEF. The coefficient is -3.571731***. The BANK dummy variable has a major effect 
on the implied CDS spread. Firms which are banks have a dummy coefficient i.e. an intercept 
change of -107.1633***. This effect means that firms that have banking as their main 
business operation are expected to have 107.1633 basis points lower spread on their 5-year 
CDS than firms which are not.  
In conclusion, a firm´s ESG score have a positive effect on its implied CDS spread. This 
effect is significant at 5% significance level.  
5.3 Robustness tests 
The following part will contain robustness tests. The robustness parts are crucial to make sure 
the results from previous tests are reliable. There are two more regressions, but these 
regressions will be pooled OLS regression model. This is done to get a more nuanced picture 
of the relationships between the ESG score and the response variables.  
Since the data is collected over time, there is also a test for a time trend, both in the WACC 
and in the implied CDS spread (IMP_DEF). The time trend component is only included in the 
OLS regression, but not the random effects model, since it is already accounted for in that 
type of model. There is also a test for making sure random effects test is more appropriate 
than a fixed effects test, a Hausman test,  (Greene, 2012). 
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5.3.1 Hausmantest  
To determine weather to use a random effect or a fixed effects model, a Hausman test is 
conducted, (Greene, 2012). The Hausman test tests which of the two tests that are the most 
efficient, given the sample and sample space. The Hausman test uses a chi2 distribution with 1 
degree of freedom. The null hypothesis of a Hausman test is to use the random effect 
regression and discard the fixed effect. The alternative hypothesis of a Hausman test states the 
fixed effects regression is more appropriate and should be used instead of the random effect. 
Generally, if there is a sample with large n and small t, then the random effect is more 
efficient. (Greene, 2012) 
5.3.1.1 Hausman test for WACC 
This part includes a Hausman test to test if random effects regression or fixed effects 
regression is more efficient for estimating the underlying data on the WACC. 
Table 5 Hausman test WACC 
Coefficients ---- 
WACC (b)           (B) (b-B)      sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 re fe          Difference   S.E 
ESG .0065476      .0013093         .0052383         .0055536 
CAP_INT -3.692827     -3.705935         .0131082         .3317199 
ln_size .4205347      .3836783         .0368564         .0709532 
LEV -.5569979     -.4834564        -.0735415         .0586102 
PXTB .2864056      .2463601         .0400455         .0367161 
BANK .699559     -.4117335         1.111292         1.140878 
Where:  
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B =inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 3.38 
Prob>chi2 = 0.7594 
The Table 5 Hausman test WACC shows that the prob>chi2 is 0.7594 there is no evidence that 
the null hypothesis for the Hausman test can be rejected. Therefore, the most efficient test to 
use for testing the panel data between fixed and random effects is the random effects model. 
This is the basis for using the random effects model.  
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5.3.1.2 Hausman test for IMP_DEF 
This part includes a Hausman test to test if random effects regression or fixed effects 
regression is more efficient for estimating the underlying data on the IMP_DEF. 
Table 6 Hausman test IMP_DEF 
Coefficients ---- 
IMP_DEF (b)           (B) (b-B)      sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 re fe          Difference   S.E 
ESG .2368187      .2103843         .0264344         .0308552 
CAP_INT -2.681669     -2.624395        -.0572739         1.869477 
ln_size -8.85822     -9.060421         .2022015         .3981181 
LEV 6.83941      7.283478         -.444068         .3206434 
PXTB -3.571731     -3.716682         .1449513          .202929 
BANK -107.1633     -113.8341         6.670807          6.31811 
Where:  
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B =inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 3.27 
Prob>chi2 = 0.7749 
From the Table 6 Hausman test IMP_DEF the results show that there is no evidence for the 
null hypothesis for this Hausman test can be rejected with Prob>chi2 of 0.7749. Which is 
insignificant at all relevant significance levels. The most appropriate model to use for testing 
the IMP_DEF is the random effects model.  
5.3.2 Pooled OLS: Hypothesis I  
In this part Hypothesis I (There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its cost of 
capital.)  will be tested by running a pooled OLS regression. The results from the regression 
will be divided into two parts. The first part is a descriptive part of the summary output, which 
explains the model over all. This part also shows the number of observations and the forecast 
ability of the tested model. The second part is the ANOVA part which provides the ANOVA 
results and explains all individual regressors, their coefficients, and their p-values. All output 
is shown in Table 7 Pooled OLS for WACC.  
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Table 7 Pooled OLS for WACC 
Summary output 
Number of obs    213  
F(7, 205)        36.51*** 
Prob > F         0.0000 
R-squared        0.5549 
Adj R-squared    0.5397 
Root MSE         1.9177 
Anova 
Source         SS df MS     
Model    939.890547 7 134.270078    
Residual 753.878361 205 3.67745542    
Tota l   1693.76891 212 7.98947598    
WACC        Coef. Std. Err. t  P>t       [95% Conf. Interval] 
ESG .0018897 .0090855 0.21 0.835     [-.0160232  .0198027] 
CAP_INT    -3.692094*** .5387558 -6.85    0.000     [-4.754307  -2.629881] 
LN_SIZE .3861347*** .1155048 3.34    0.001       [.158405  .6138644] 
LEV -.484282*** .0966353 -5.01    0.000     [-.6748084  -.2937556] 
PXTB .256532*** .0601721 4.26    0.000      [.1378965  .3751676] 
BANK -.3952888 1.869773 -0.21 0.833      [-4.08174  3.291162] 
t 1.31692*** .1621458 8.12    0.000      [.9972331  1.636608] 
_cons    -2651.244*** 327.1477 -8.10    0.000     [-3296.249  -2006.238] 
The results from the pooled OLS regressions shows how the independent variables affect the interest variable, 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)  
* Significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% leven 
*** significant at 1% level 
The Table 7 Pooled OLS for WACC shows that the f-value which is a measurement for the 
combined robustness of the regression is 36.51*** which renders a p-value of 0.0000. This 
hints the model is highly significant. The model has a R-squared of 0.5549 which implies the 
model has moderate forecasting power. The adjusted R2 is a bit lower than the unadjusted R-
squared. With an adjusted R-squared of 0.5397 the model hints it does not suffer from over 
fitting which could become a problem if too many regressors are included in the model.  
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The pooled OLS regression shows that ESG is highly insignificant. With a p-value of only 
0.835, there can be no conclusions, at any relevant significance level that ESG score would 
have any effect on a firm´s weighted average cost of capital (WACC). At least not in this 
sample and this sample space. 
Whilst ESG is not significant, other variables have great significance of a firm´s weighted 
average cost of capital. The capital intensity (CAP_INT) has a negative coefficient of -
3.692094*** on WACC. This tells us that a firm which have proportionally more fixed assets 
would also tend to have a higher WACC.  The size which is measured in its natural 
logarithmic form to prevent skewness in the data (Bauer & Hann, 2010) also has a significant 
effect on the firm´s WACC. Ln_size have a coefficient of .3861347***. This implies that 
firms with larger balance sheets have higher cost of capital than firms with smaller. The effect 
cannot be interpreted linearly since the size variable is measured in logarithmic form.  The 
model also tells leverage (LEV) has a negative impact on a firm´s WACC. The variable has a 
coefficient of -.484282***. The negative coefficient implies that firms which are more 
leveraged have lower cost of capital. Price to book-ratio (PXTB) which measures how much 
the market values a firm´s equity divided by how the firm´s books value the equity has a 
positive coefficient on a firm´s WACC. With a coefficient of 0.256532*** the conclusion can 
be drawn that firms which the market values its equity higher than the firm´s books tend to 
have higher cost of capital.  BANK have a coefficient of -.3952888 but is insignificant. This 
implies that the fact a firm being a bank does not affect its cost of capital and that these effects 
must be attributed to other factors. Lastly the variable time (t) influences the firms´ cost of 
capital. With a coefficient of 1.31692*** it implies that overall the firms´ WACC has 
increased by approximately 1.3% annually. This effect can be due to external factors such as 
macroeconomic variables which are not firm specific and affects the whole economy but will 
not be discussed further than this. The time variable is tested separately to verify its relevance 
in part 5.4.3 Time tests. 
In conclusion, there are no evidence from the pooled OLS regression that ESG score has any 
significant effect on a firms WACC, therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with 
evidence from this model.  
5.3.3 Pooled OLS: Hypothesis II 
In this section hypothesis II, (There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and 
implied CDS spread.) is tested. This part will test the hypothesis using a Pooled OLS 
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regression on the implied CDS spread (imp_def) variable. All output is shown in Table 8 
Pooled OLS for imp_def.  
Table 8 Pooled OLS for imp_def 
Summary output 
Number of 
obs    
213 
F(7, 205)        19.64*** 
Prob > F         0.0000 
R-squared        0.4014 
Adj R-
squared    
0.3809 
Root MSE         20.028 
Anova 
Source SS df MS   
Model 55134.5092 7 7876.35845    
Residual 82232.3641 205 401.133483    
Total 137366.873 212 647.956949    
IMP_DEF Coef. Std. Err. t     P>t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
ESG .2081717** .0948894 2.19    0.029      [.0210874 .3952561] 
CAP_INT -2.67716 5.626815 -0.48    0.635     [-13.77101 8.416689] 
ln_size -9.069785*** 1.206343 -7.52    0.000     [-11.44822 -6.691355] 
LEV 7.286625*** 1.009268 7.22    0.000       [5.29675  9.276501] 
PXTB -3.755458*** .6284433 -5.98    0.000     [-4.994499 -2.516417] 
BANK -113.8968*** 19.52808 -5.83    0.000     [-152.3984 -75.39512] 
t 8.099279*** 1.693466 4.78 0.000      [4.760435 11.43812] 
_cons -16206.72*** 3416.761 -4.74    0.000     [-22943.22 -9470.225] 
The results from the pooled OLS regressions shows how the independent variables affect the interest variable 
implied CDS spread (IMP_DEF) which is measured in basis points(bp). 
* Significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% leven 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
The Table 8 Pooled OLS for imp_def shows the values for the pooled OLS on the implied 
CDS spread(imp_def). The table shows that the regression model is based on 213 
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observations spanning over 3 years. The model has a f-value of 19.64***. The model has a R2 
value of 0.4014 and an adjusted R2 value of 0.3809. These metrics combined hints that the 
model has moderate forecasting power and it does not suffer from over fitting since its 
adjusted R-squared is only slightly lower than its unadjusted value.  
This model shows that ESG score has a coefficient of .2081717. This positive coefficient 
implies that it can be concluded that higher ESG score will lead to higher implied CDS 
spread, i.e. a firm with good ESG score will have a higher probability of default. This 
conclusion can be drawn and the risk for type I error being 0.05 or 5% 
Furthermore, there are more significant variables which all affect the implied CDS spread 
(IMP_DEF). Capital intensity (CAP_INT) has an insignificant effect on IMP_DEF, with a p-
value of 0.635. The size measured in its natural logarithmic form (LN_SIZE) has a negative 
effect on IMP_DEF with a coefficient of -9.069785***. This is intuitive as larger firms is 
often more financially sound and having a lower risk to default, (Bauer & Hann, 2010). 
Leverage also have a significant effect on IMP_DEF. With a coefficient of 7.286625***, the 
regression model hints that increased leverage will lead to a firm having a larger probability to 
default. For each time the leverage multiplies, the IMP_DEF will increase by 7.28662 bp. 
Price to book (PXTB) has a negative coefficient on the IMP_DEF. With a coefficient of -
3.755458***, the IMP_DEF will decrease if the price to book ratio increases. This may be 
due to the market valuing a firm’s equity better in case of default and thus if the market values 
the firm’s equity higher, the firm is seen less likely to default. 
For firms that are banks are expected to have a large advantage relative to not being a bank. 
The dummy variable has a coefficient of -113.8968***, implying a firm which is a bank will, 
ceteris paribus, have 113.8968 bp lower spread on its credit default swaps. 
In conclusion, there are evidence that ESG score have a significant and positive effect on a 
firm´s implied CDS spread. This is basis for rejecting the second null hypothesis. 
5.3.4 Time tests 
This part is incorporated to test whether it is relevant to include a time variable in the pooled 
OLS regressions. If there is evidence that there exists a time trend present in the data, it has to 
be included in the Pooled OLS regression to avoid omitted variable bias. The output from the 
time test for WACC is shown in Table 9 Time test WACC. 
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Table 9 Time test WACC 
Summary output 
Number of obs    213 
F(1, 211)        43.86 
Prob > F         0.0000 
R-squared        0.1721 
Adj R-squared    0.1682 
Root MSE         2.578 
Anova 
Source SS df MS 
Model 291.491566 1 291.491566    
Residual 1402.27734 211 6.64586418    
Total 1693.76891 212 7.98947598    
WACC Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
T 1.432745*** .2163374 6.62    0.000      [1.006285   1.859204] 
_cons -2883.741*** 436.5689 -6.61    0.000     [-3744.336  -2023.14] 
Where: 
SS – sum of squares 
DF – Degrees of freedom 
MS – Mean of squares 
* Significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
The results for testing if there exist a trend in all the firms´ WACC are shown in Table 9 Time 
test WACC. There exists a time trend (t) and this will skew the results if this variable is not 
included. When this variable is included, it explains factors which have affected all firms the 
tested years. Since the trend is upwards sloping with a coefficient of 1.432745***, it can be 
concluded that the WACC has increased the recent years. Since there exists a trend in the 
data, the time term must be included in the pooled OLS regressions to test the effect on the 
WACC, or the model will suffer from omitted variable bias. The conclusion is: in the sample 
space, each year passing, the firms have seen their WACC increase by an estimation of 
1.432745%. It is appropriate to include a time variable in the Pooled OLS regression on 
WACC. 
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Table 10 Time test imp_def  
Summary output 
Number of obs    213 
F(1, 211)        9.53 
Prob > F         0.0023 
R-squared        0.0432 
Adj R-squared    0.0387 
Root MSE         24.958 
Anova 
Source SS df MS 
Model 5934.67606 1 5934.67606    
Residual 131432.197 211 622.901408    
Total 137366.873 212 647.956949    
IMP_DEF Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
T 6.464789*** 2.094428 3.09    0.002      [2.336104 10.59347] 
_cons -12983.34*** 4226.557 -3.07    0.002     [-21315.02 -4651.651] 
Where: 
SS – sum of squares 
DF – Degrees of freedom 
MS – Mean of squares 
* Significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
The Table 10 Time test imp_def shows that the implied CDS spread has increased the three 
recent years for all the firms in the tested data. With a coefficient of 6.464789***. This 
implies it can be concluded with a chance of a type I error of only 0.002 that there has been an 
increasing spread for the implied CDS. These results imply that the riskiness of all firms in 
aggregation have increased the recent years. This can be due to unknown macro factors or 
anything of its sort. The fact that the implied CDS spread have increased the recent years hints 
that the marketplace has become riskier. And it is appropriate to include a time variable in the 
Pooled OLS regression on imp_def. 
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6.0 Discussion 
This section is where the discussion is due. There will be four types of discussions- a critical 
discussion, a general, and a specific discussion regarding each of the hypothesis´. The critical 
discussion will have its focus on the shortcomings of the results and the structure of the thesis.  
6.1 Critical discussion 
Since there are missing data in some of the variables, especially data from 2018 and 2017, 
there are some assumptions that had to be made. This is done to be able to execute the 
regressions and to satisfy the full rank assumptions of the regressions. Without the full rank 
assumption, there can be no regressions made. Therefore, it is crucial to determine how to 
handle the missing values and in a case of missing values one can choose between some 
possibilities. Either the observation can be fully dismissed, and the regression is done without 
its participation. This can be wise to consider if there are many observations or the missing 
data is completely random, (Allison, 2001). But in cases where there are fewer observations, 
each observation has an increasing importance for the accuracy of the results. To dismiss an 
observation could be wise if the data is completely random. But in cases where the data is not 
completely random, it is better to include the missing values by predicting it, (Allison, 2001). 
In cases with missing ESG scores, all data which were missing, which summed to 8 
companies with either one or two missing values. All data which was missing was replaced by 
the most recent available data from the missing date. This makes sense since the correlation 
between the recent years have been very high. The correlation between the ESG scores the 
recent years are shown in Table 11 in the appendix and is above 0.9 for all time differences.  
Regarding the missing data concerning leverage, there are two cases where assumptions had 
to be made. This regards Lundin Petroleum AB and Swedish Match AB. Both firms have 
negative equity and their leverage therefore becomes negative. To have negative leverage 
would essentially mean a firm either is bankrupt since equity must be positive or that the firm 
has negative liabilities. To make sure the leverage measurement was not corrupted by these 
outliers and their unreliable observations, their leverage observations was assumed to be 0. 
These replacements were done with a few alternatives in mind. Either the values could be 0, it 
could be 1 or they could fully be dismissed. Since there are relatively few observations in the 
dataset, to exclude observations which otherwise were correct, would not increase the 
accuracy of the testing. So, the decision is to count the values as 0 or 1, both equally arbitrary. 
But since 0 is closer to the actual negative values, it makes more sense to use it rather than 1.  
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There is also an issue regarding timing of the data points. The data which regards the previous 
years are measured per the dates being exactly one and two years back from the data which 
2019´s data regards. Therefore, the data is intended to be of 2019-05-03, 2018-05-03, and 
2017-05-03. Since no firm had their annual or interim reports published on any on these dates; 
the data is collected for the dates which is the closest in time. This resulted in the data being 
captured for the dates 2018-06-30 and 2017-06-30. However, this should not be a problem 
since the interest variable data, the Thomson Reuter´s ESG score is measured and updated 
annually so this uneven timing should not corrupt the data. For the values presented for 2019, 
no values suffer from timing issues and all data are collected per the same date.   
There is also an issue regarding the sample size for both hypothesis´. The paper is intended to 
measure how the ESG score affects a firm´s WACC and implied CDS spread. To make the 
hypothesis´ comparable to previous literature and especially international literature that use 
the same methodology, (Bauer & Hann, 2010), the most relevant measure of ESG score must 
be one which is internationally recognised. The Thomson Reuters ESG score is there for used 
as ESG measure. This paper uses all 71 Swedish firms which have a reported Thomson 
Reuters ESG score and uses all observations for 2019, 2018, and 2017. 
Lastly, there are concerns regarding the Thomson Reuters ESG score. The score itself is 
amongst the world´s leading ESG scores with over 8000+ firms which are evaluated, (Thomson 
Reuters, 2019). Although the score itself has a thorough methodology and a wide coverage, 
there are concerns with ESG scores overall and its usage as a metric. To determine each firm´s 
ESG score, Thomson Reuters must use self-reported data which the firms themselves publish, 
(Thomson Reuters, 2019). There could be real incentives for firms to some extent enhance their 
ESG reporting. Especially since previous literature stipulate that increased ESG scores lead to 
better access to finance, (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013), increased credit ratings, (Attig, 
Ghoul, Guedhami, & Suh, 2013), and lowered cost of capital, (El Ghoul & al, 2011). This is 
certainly troubling since the scores themselves could be misrepresentative and in extension 
skew the results for this thesis. However, no matter how troubling this might be, there is no 
evidence to suggest that one or another firm is more inclined to cheat or manipulate their ESG 
scores more than anyone else. Therefore, if there is manipulation, it can not be assumed to be 
not random nor systematic in a way that would skew the results.   
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6.2 Discussion Hypothesis I 
The first hypothesis regards if there are any statistical evidence that Thomson Reuters ESG 
score has any effect on a firms WACC. The findings from both tests suggests that there is no 
evidence at any significance level (1%, 5% or 10%) that a firm´s ESG score should have any 
effect on its WACC. This is true for both the pooled OLS regression and the random effects 
regression that are used to test the WACC. In neither of the regressions, the ESG score had 
any significant effect. This contrasts the findings of previous literature, (El Ghoul & al, 2011), 
(Goss & Roberts, 2011), (Oikonomou & al, 2014). 
The results could have been different, had the number of observations increased and thus the 
standard error decreased to receive a greater t- and z-value for the different regressions. This 
effect should however not be overestimated. One must consider that the reported p-values are 
0.529 for the random effects regression and 0.835 for the pooled OLS regression, so for these 
p-values to decrease to a maximum of 0.10 or preferably 0.05 or even 0.01, there would have 
to be a great increase of observations, which just is not present on the used sample space. 
Even if the results would remain equal but the standard error decrease, and the coefficient gets 
significance, the estimated coefficient is still .0018897 which is interpreted as: if the ESG 
score increased by 1, then the firm´s WACC would increase by 0.0018897% or 0.18bp. To 
put this in perspective, the difference between performing the worst and best is 99 points, so 
the absolute maximum estimated effect would be 0.187% or 18bp, for calculation see 
Equation I in appendix. This is a moderate effect since the WACC usually being measured in 
percentage but can be compared to previous literature: 100bp lower spread on corporate 
bonds, (El Ghoul & al, 2011) and 7-18 bp lower interest rate for bank loans, (Goss & Roberts, 
2011).  
6.3 Hypothesis II 
The second hypothesis regarding how a firm´s Thomson Reuters ESG score affects its implied 
CDS spread. In both the random effects and the pooled OLS regression, the ESG score has a 
significant effect on the implied CDS spread. For the random effects, the coefficient is 
.2368187**, which is significant at 5% significance level and for the pooled OLS the 
coefficient is .2081717**, also significant at 5%. The coefficients are not equal but similar. 
The result stand in contrast to those of the first hypothesis. Here there are evidence that ESG 
score do in fact affect a firm´s implied CDS spread and the null hypothesis that ESG does not 
affect the implied CDS spread can be rejected at 5% significance level from both the tests. 
The results can be interpreted as when ESG scores increase, so does the implied CDS spread. 
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This result is somewhat unexpected and by looking a previous literature which studied 
another proxy for riskiness, the credit rating. There is evidence that higher ESG lead to higher 
credit ratings, (Attig, Ghoul, Guedhami, & Suh, 2013).  
 
6.4 General discussion  
The results from the two hypotheses´ are somewhat unexpected. Since the hypothesis I (There 
is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its cost of capital.) could not be rejected 
whilst hypothesis II (There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its riskiness) 
could, on both the random effects and pooled OLS regression. This hints that ESG have a 
statistically significant effect on the implied CDs spread but not the WACC. At first glance 
this is unintuitive. It would not be an unreasonable assumption to make that the variables 
WACC and implied CDS spread would be correlated, since the cost of capital theoretically 
should increase when the risk increases. However, this is not the case and the correlation 
coefficient between the variables have in this sample space been -0.1451, (see Table 2 
Correlation matrix) so the results are not unreasonable.  
The results are robust, since different models have been used to test the relationship between a 
firm´s ESG score and the response variables. When several models are used, and the result 
remains, it relieves uncertainties regarding the efficiency of the specific model.  
When comparing the results on WACC with those of the results from previous literature, there 
are slight differences. Whilst (Oikonomou & al, 2014) measured the effect ESG had on 
corporate debt, (El Ghoul & al, 2011) measured the cost of equity, and (Goss & Roberts, 
2011) measured the cost of bank loans. None of these studies studied the effect ESG had on a 
firm´s total cost of capital, but rather only how it affected components of it. There could 
therefore be an effect which compensated other factors of capital cost, that are not obvious 
when studying only components of the total cost of capital. If there in fact exists an effect like 
this, it would help explain why the results from the literature differ from those of this paper. 
The more obvious explanation for why the results differs is that the sample and sample spaces 
are not the same. When dealing with different sample spaces, it could be the case that there is 
in fact an effect that ESG have on cost of capital on the U.S. equity market which is not 
present on the Swedish equity market. There could also be the case that the true effects of 
ESG on WACC are the same but due to sampling bias in either previous literature or in this 
paper, which skew the results.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
This is a study conducted exclusively on the Swedish market and examines the relationship 
between a firm´s ESG and its WACC and implied CDS. The study uses data from 2019, 2018, 
and 2017. 
Regarding hypothesis I, (There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its cost of 
capital) which tests how ESG relates to a firm´s weighted average cost of capital, there can be 
no rejection of the null hypothesis. This is the case no matter how the tests are structured. It 
can therefore not be concluded that ESG have any significant effect on a firm´s weighted 
average cost of capital. At least not on the Swedish market the years 2019, 2018, and 2017. 
This contrasts with previous literature, which may be due to different modelling or different 
sample spaces.  
Regarding hypothesis II, (There is no relationship between a firm´s ESG score and its 
riskiness) which measures how a firm´s ESG score affect the implied CDS spread. The 
hypothesis can be rejected at 5% confidence level. This is the case no matter how the models 
are structured, and the estimated marginal effects differs between .2081717 and .2368187. This 
implies that increasing a firm´s ESG score will, ceteris paribus, increase the implied CDS 
spread.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 11 
Correlation between the ESG scores for 2019, 2018, and 2017 
 2019 2018 2017 
2019 1   
2018 0,952282 1  
2017 0,906941 0,938548 1 
The correlation has been over 0.9 for all years, rendering a high accuracy of the predictability for an ESG score a 
given year. The correlation matrix was made by excluding the missing values and all other assumptions from the 
model. All observations are collected per the date given in section 3.0 Data 
Equation I 
This is the maximum estimated effect the ESG score would have on the WACC given a firm 
performs worst compared to best  
99 ∗ .0018897% = 0.187%=18.7bp 
Table 12 
 Missing Thomson Reuters ESG values 
Firm Year 2019 Year 2018 Year 2017 
DOMETIC GROUP AB Not missing Missing Missing 
DUSTIN GROUPAB Not missing Not missing Missing 
EPIROC AB Not missing Missing Missing 
INDUTRADE AB Not missing Missing Missing 
LOOMIS AB Not missing Missing Missing 
MEKONOMEN AB Not missing Missing Missing 
NOBINA AB Not missing Not missing Missing 
SECTRA AB Not missing Not missing Missing 
These are all firms which have at least one missing value for its Thomson Reuters ESG score. There are in total 
8 firms which have at least one missing value.  
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Table 13 
Thomson Reuters ESG score assessment 
Pillar Category Indicators in rating weights Pillar weight 
Enviromental Resource Use 19 11% 34% 
 
Emissions 22 12% 
 
 
Innovation 20 11% 
 
Social Workforce 29 16% 36% 
 
Human rights 8 5% 
 
 
Community 14 8% 
 
 
product response 12 7% 
 
Governance management 34 19% 31% 
 
Shareholders 12 7% 
 
 
CSR strategy 8 4,5% 
 
Total 
 
178 100% 100% 
Source: Thomson Reuters ESG methodology 2019 
This table is provided by Thomson Reuters and describes how the collected measurements are further grouped 
and weighted to determine the values of the environmental, social, and governance scores. 
Table 14 
Firms with information gathered from annual reports 
Firm Information gathered Year 
Balder AB Leverage 2017,2018 
Mekonomen AB Leverage 2017, 2018 
Clas Ohlsson AB Leverage 2017, 2018 
Fingerprint cards AB Leverage 2017, 2018 
Skanska AB Leverage 2017, 2018 
Sectra Leverage 2017/16, 2018/17 
 
Table 15 
Compilation on OMXS30 sustainability reportinng 
Firm Provides annual sustainability report Comments 
ABB Ltd  yes 
 
Alfa Laval  yes 
 
Assa Abloy B  yes 
 
AstraZeneca  yes 
 
Atlas Copco A yes 
 
Atlas Copco B yes 
 
Autoliv SDB  yes 
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Boliden yes 
 
Electrolux B  yes 
 
Ericsson B  yes 
 
Essity B  yes 
 
Getinge B  yes in combination with annual 
report 
Hennes & Mauritz B  yes 
 
Hexagon B  yes in combination with annual 
report 
Investor B  yes in combination with annual 
report 
Kinnevik B  yes 
 
Nordea Bank  yes ”sustainable investment report” 
Sandvik  yes in combination with annual 
report 
SCA B  yes 
 
SEB A yes 
 
Securitas B  yes 
 
Skanska B  yes 
 
SKF B  yes 
 
SSAB A  yes 
 
Swedbank A  yes 
 
Swedish Match  yes 
 
Svenska Handelsbanken 
A  
yes 
 
Tele2 B  yes 
 
Telia Company  yes 
 
Volvo B yes in combination with annual 
report 
Source: All individual firm´s latest annual report 
Collection of all firms on the OMXS30 index and whether they provide an annual sustainability report. All data 
is collected manually from the individual firm’s latest sustainability report or annual report 
 
 
